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The Shelf Is Not the Strategy

Nov 6
9 min read
Three smartphones showing the CourtReserve app: places to play near St. Augustine, available court times at Old Coast Pickleball, and a booking review screen

Image: CourtReserve


David Ogilvy wrote a sentence I have built a career on.


"The consumer isn't a moron; she is your wife."


He put it in his book in 1963, aimed at an industry that shouted at people and assumed they were stupid. His point ran deeper than manners. You insult her intelligence, he said, if you think a slogan and a few vapid adjectives will persuade her. She wants all the information you can give her.


Twenty-five years in marketing. Agency work. Big consumer brands. I have spent countless hours in consumer data - the numbers, and the harder part, what is actually going on inside her head - working out how to connect honestly with the person on the other side of the purchase.


And I have done the same work inside this industry. As CMO of the Racquet Sports Professionals Association, I led the move from USPTA to the RSPA. The people we had to win there were the pros themselves. Before we moved, we talked to professionals in all 17 divisions - presidents, past presidents, board members, directors, associate directors, teaching pros. A change like that dies without their buy-in. There was real pushback. We did it anyway. It worked.


The consumer rules. So when something arrives that is plainly good for her, I pay attention.


CourtReserve just opened its Network in all 50 states. A player can find a court in a strange city and book it as a guest. No account. No membership. For the player, the benefit is not subtle.


I start with the consumer. I always have, whether I am working with clubs, brands or associations.


CourtReserve is the subject here. It is not alone - others are building versions of the same door, and I am researching the rest of the field. More to come. This piece is about what CourtReserve did, and I dug into it the way I dig into everything - including other industries that lived through the same shift, and what it did to the businesses standing behind the door.


What follows is longer than I planned. The subject earned it. This is not really a product launch. It is a door opening - for players first, and over time, for how every club operates and makes its money.


Read it. Tell me where I am wrong.

The facts, plainly. A player can open one app, find clubs, courts, clinics, instructors and tournaments nearby, and book eligible courts and activities as a guest.


Qualifying clubs on CourtReserve were listed automatically, at no extra subscription cost. Eligible public booking was switched on with the launch.


In the Florida and Utah beta that ran from September: 73 percent of bookings came from players who were not members of the club they booked. Three in four bookings were programs - clinics, open play, lessons - not court reservations. And 21 percent of first-time guests joined a club afterward.


Those are CourtReserve's numbers.


They measure mix, not newness. A player who is not a member of the club they booked can hold a membership across town. The same page carries the number running the other way: more than one in three beta bookings came from players with no CourtReserve account anywhere.


It is also the latest move from a company that has been building hard - more clubs, and a $54 million growth investment in 2025.


It is a product launch.


It is also a question. And it is not the one being asked.


The question is not whether players will like it. They will. The question is what it does to the clubs on the shelf.

That depends on one word.


INCREMENTAL, OR REROUTED


Every booking that arrives through a platform is one of two things.


Incremental: a consumer, a visit, a dollar that would not have existed without the platform.


Rerouted: a consumer the business would have had anyway, now arriving through a channel the business controls less.


Rerouted is not automatically bad. It is a question about economics and control, not a verdict by itself.


Both can happen at the same time. The evidence shows it.


A platform can work. The fight is over the mix - and over who holds the power once the mix matters.


Other industries have already run this experiment at scale. Their results are not prophecies. They are evidence. And they point in both directions at once.


FITNESS: THE PLATFORM SAID IT PLAINLY


ClassPass is the closest cousin CourtReserve has. Membership businesses. Perishable inventory. A platform that fills empty spots with guests.


Start with the platform's own words. They are more honest than its critics.


ClassPass tells prospective partners, in its current guidance: "ClassPass is NOT a lead generator."


For every 100 direct clients a business has before joining, it says, expect roughly 102 after. And on loyalty, its users "often prefer variety and remain multi-studio users rather than brand loyalists."


Worth sitting with.


The platform is telling you, in writing, that its consumer is a shopper by design.


The other side is real too. ClassPass reports 94 percent of its users are new to the venues they visit. It reports 99 percent of businesses using both Mindbody and ClassPass from December 2024 to December 2025 came out ahead on incremental revenue, under its own methodology - which counts the ClassPass revenue itself, plus direct revenue from consumers ClassPass brought in, and nets out displaced direct revenue. Revenue, not profit.


Those are company numbers, drawn from defined partner populations. Treat them the way you treat any vendor's numbers - including CourtReserve's beta numbers. Directionally useful. Not a verdict.


Fitness verdict: the platform's own pages describe a consumer built for variety, not loyalty. Remove the discount and you remove the sharpest risk. You do not remove every risk.


HOTELS: THE DOOR, AND WHAT THE DOOR COSTS


Hotels have lived with discovery platforms for two decades. They hold the strongest evidence that a platform can feed the business it also taxes.


In a Cornell experiment run in late 2008, four hotels were cycled on and off Expedia in stretches of seven to eleven days. When listed, their reservations through other channels rose 7.5 to 26 percent - above and beyond the bookings Expedia itself delivered.


Exposure on the platform sent consumers to book direct. Researchers call it the billboard effect. A 2017 follow-up found it still at work.


That is the generous half.


The other half is what happened to the terms. Visibility on the big hotel platforms became a product. Preferred programs. Visibility boosters. Sold back to hotels for additional commission, on top of the base rate.


Visibility came with the booking. Extra visibility cost extra.


In Europe, regulators eventually stepped in. Under the Digital Markets Act, Booking.com had to drop its price-parity rules across the EEA.


None of that was inevitable. It is what can happen, over years, when one company owns the door consumers walk through.


The cleanest single measurement of both effects at once comes from restaurants. A peer-reviewed study in Management Science, using Chicago-area restaurants on the major delivery platforms, found the platforms replaced part of independent restaurants' own takeout sales - while increasing those same restaurants' dine-in visits.


Growth and cannibalization. Same dataset.


And the study's estimated positive effect for fast-food chains was roughly four times the effect for independents. The effects were not the same for every business.


COURTRESERVE'S MODEL: DIFFERENT, ON PURPOSE


Credit the structure. It is genuinely different from the hard cases.

Clubs keep their own prices and booking rules. There is no discounted multi-club subscription undercutting membership. The guest pays the club's price. The booking lands in the club's own system. Inclusion costs nothing extra. And a club can review its listing, or take itself off the Network, in its settings.


One detail in CourtReserve's own documentation matters. A public booking player is not an ordinary guest in the system. Guest settings, guest fees and guest limits do not apply, and no profile is created. If that player later joins, the member profile the club creates does not automatically link the earlier bookings. The club can still work the relationship. It just has to reconcile the person by hand.


The single most destructive mechanism in the fitness story - the platform selling your product back to your consumers at a lower price - is not in this model.


What is in this model is a combination golf has already argued about. In 2020, John Brown, the CEO of Brown Golf, walked through GolfNow's barter contracts for the National Golf Course Owners Association. GolfNow's fight turned on barter inventory - trade tee times the platform could sell for itself. CourtReserve has no barter inventory. The shared question is narrower, and it was never really about technology.


It was about contract language. Data access. And whose inventory the platform had reason to sell first.


One company holding both the operating system and the front door is not a conspiracy. It is a structure. Structures deserve watching, not accusing.


CourtReserve says clubs keep a direct relationship with their players. Today, on the evidence, that is true.


The questions worth asking are the ones that decide whether it stays true. Can you export your guest records, in full, whenever you want? Who controls how clubs are ranked when a player searches - and can that ranking ever be bought? If the terms of being found change, what does leaving cost you? Not the Network toggle. The whole system underneath it.


An announcement is not a contract. Operators who ask are not being cynical.


They are being operators.


WHAT THIS LOOKS LIKE MONDAY MORNING


The clubs that come out of this well will not be the ones with the strongest opinions. They will be the ones who can answer, with their own numbers, whether the Network is feeding them or rerouting them.


Start with the setup itself. Which membership type supplies your public rules. What inventory is exposed. Which of your guest limits never reach a public player.


Then five measures. Starting now.


  • How many Network guests are genuinely new to your club. Not lapsed members. Not your regulars in a new doorway.

  • Whether those guests come back at 30, 90 and 365 days - and whether the repeat booking comes to you direct, or through the app again.

  • Whether any members downgrade, cancel, and reappear as guests.

  • What a Network guest is worth after the real costs - labor, processing, servicing - against what a direct guest is worth.

  • Whether guest bookings ever take a prime-time slot a member wanted.


And treat "new to your file" as what it is - an observation, not proof the visit would never have happened.


None of that requires CourtReserve's permission. It requires a club that measures channels instead of counting bookings.


WHERE I LAND


Easier access is a consumer benefit. Full stop.

A player who can find a court in a strange city and be on it within the hour is good for this sport. Anyone who loves the sport should say so.


CourtReserve deserves credit for the design. It built discovery without taking pricing, booking rules, or the player relationship out of the club's hands.


Whether it becomes growth for a particular club is a separate question. It has three conditions.


Is the demand actually new - or is it your own demand, wearing a new jacket?


Does your membership still earn its value once access is easy? In priority. In programming. In belonging. Not in mere permission to play.


And do you keep control of your pricing, and your consumer, after the first visit?


The clubs that answer yes to all three will look back at this launch as new demand on terms they kept.


The clubs that cannot are in a different spot. The channel can hurt them - and expose them - at the same time.


And CourtReserve will not stand on this shelf alone. The space is crowding, fast. What it means for the clubs underneath it is just getting started.


The shelf is built. Being on it is not the strategy. What a stranger finds when they reach for you - and what you do with them once they walk in - still is.


Go find your court.


Mike


SOURCES

- CourtReserve, "CourtReserve Network - Get Found and Booked by New Players" (club announcement and FAQ; beta results, guest booking, club controls): https://courtreserve.com/courtreserve-network-announcement/

- CourtReserve Help Center, "Public Booking: Setup Guide and Overview" (public booking uses a selected membership type's pricing, waivers and policies; required SMS notifications): https://help.courtreserve.com/en/articles/11787240-public-booking-setup-guide-and-overview

- CourtReserve Help Center, "Understanding Guests in CourtReserve" (public booking players are not ordinary guests; guest settings, fees and limits do not apply; a later member profile does not link earlier public bookings): https://help.courtreserve.com/en/articles/12242627-understanding-guests-in-courtreserve

- ClassPass partner guidance, "Unlocking revenue potential" (the "NOT a lead generator" passage and user-loyalty language): https://classpass.my.site.com/help/s/article/Unlocking-Revenue-Potential-How-ClassPass-Helps-Fitness-Wellness-Businesses

- ClassPass, 2026 Industry Impact Report (94 percent new-to-venue; 99 percent positive incremental revenue under the Revenue Guarantee methodology, December 2024 to December 2025; partner survey n=366): https://classpass.com/partners/2026-industry-impact-report

- Anderson, "The Billboard Effect: Online Travel Agent Impact on Non-OTA Reservation Volume," Cornell Hospitality Report, October 2009 (four JHM hotels, October to December 2008, cycled on and off Expedia in seven-to-eleven-day periods; 7.5 to 26 percent lift in non-Expedia reservations): https://ecornell-impact.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2014/07/The-Billboard-Effect.pdf

- Anderson and Han, "The Billboard Effect: Still Alive and Well," Cornell Hospitality Report, 2017 (follow-up finding the effect still at work): https://ecommons.cornell.edu/entities/publication/cc99c641-5795-4e66-b35b-9795385c6f52

- Li and Wang, "On-Demand Delivery Platforms and Restaurant Sales," Management Science (Chicago-area restaurants; substitution of independents' takeout, dine-in spillover, estimated positive effect for fast-food chains roughly four times independents): https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01010

- Brown, "How Barter Agreement Language Could Be Sinking Your Profits," National Golf Course Owners Association, September 2020 (GolfNow barter contract mechanics and incentive structure): https://www.ngcoa.org/golf-business-weekly/2020/september/week-5/barter-language

- Mainsail Partners, "CourtReserve Secures a $54 Million Growth Investment from Mainsail Partners," October 21, 2025: https://mainsailpartners.com/courtreserve-secures-a-54-million-growth-investment-from-mainsail-partners-to-accelerate-innovation-in-racquet-paddle-club-software/

- Ogilvy, Confessions of an Advertising Man (1963), p. 96 (the "consumer isn't a moron" passage and "She wants all the information you can give her")

- Booking.com Partner Hub programme documentation, "Preferred Partner Programme" and "Visibility Booster" (greater exposure in search results in exchange for increased commission, on top of the base rate)

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